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SCRATCHING THE SURFACE: DOES NEW YORK'S
PUBLIC TRUST LAW PREVENT SUBSURFACE

ACCESS TO NATURAL GAS BELOW PARKLAND IN
THE MARCELLUS SHALE?
Susan J. Kraham* & Lisa K. Perfetto"
The origins of the public trust doctrine ma} be traced back to
Roman laiw. The Institutes qf Justinianstate: "By the lav of nature these
things are common to all mankind - the air running water the sea, and
consequently the shores of the sea. " The traditionalscope of the public
trust doctrine in the UnitedStates affirms the public right to use watersfor
navigation,fishing, and commerce. The precise expression of the doctrine
varies from state to state because each state is responsiblefor applying
the public trust doctrine within its borders.New York applies the doctrine
to prohibit the alienation of parkland or the conversion of parkland to
non-park use absent authorization by the Legislature. Uncertainties
remain, howtever as to the full scope of lands and actions covered under
this doctrine. For instance, no court has spoken directly to the doctrine's
applicabilityto a subsurface use or alienation. This question has gained
new sign/ifcance as Yew York takes steps toward commencing shale gas
development within the state. Regulationsproposedby the Aeui York State
Department(fEnvironmental Conservationiwould permit the exploitation
qf shale gas resources underlyingstate lands provided such resources are
accessed iwithout disturbing the land surface. This ma be accomplished
via a horizontaliwellbore connectedto a iwell sitedon adjacentprivateland.
This articleexamines the scope of the alienation ofparklanddoctrine and
examines its applicabilityto subsurface impacts ofshale gas development.
*Susan J. Kraham is the Senior Staff Attorney at the Columbia Environmental
Law Clinic. With her students, she is engaged on a wide variety of issues relating to hydraulic fracturing, ranging from NEPA litigation to counseling on local
zoning issues. Ms. Kraham previously was an Associate Clinical Professor at the
Rutgers Environmental Law Clinic. Prior to joining the Clinic, Ms. Kraham was
Counsel to the President of New Jersey Audubon Society. She clerked for the
Honorable Gary Stein, Justice, New Jersey Supreme Court and was both a Skadden and Echoing Green Fellow.
Lisa K. Perfetto is a Staff Attorney for the Delaware Riverkeeper Network, and
received her J.D. in 2011 from Columbia Universitv School of Law. During law
school, Ms. Perfetto spent four semesters in the Columbia Environmental Law
Clinic. This article was written in the author's private capacity and does not necessarily represent the viewxs of the Delaware Riverkeeper Network.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States' reliance on fossil fuel has spurred the
development of unconventional fuel sources; most recently, this has
meant the exploitation of natural gas stores in the Marcellus Shale,
a deep rock formation partially underlying New York. Because the
formation is so dense, a technique called "hydraulic fracturing" is
used to increase gas recovery by creating fissures in the rock through
which natural gas may more easily flow. The Marcellus Shale,
underlying portions of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland,
and West Virginia, is primarily found one mile or more beneath
the earth's surface. Production from the Marcellus Shale began
in 2005 from a well in Pennsylvania. By 2007, production from
unconventional sources (including shale gas and coal bed methane)
reached 8.7 trillion cubic feet/yr, an increase of nearly sixty-five
percent over rates in 1998.3 Shale gas alone now accounts for one
fifth of U.S. supplies.4 Exploitation of these new sources necessitates
the use of alternate technologies, which in turn present an array of
environmental concerns not posed by conventional drilling.
'David M. Kargbo et al., Natural Gas Plays in the AMarcellus Shale: Challenges
andPotentialOpportunities,44 ENVTL. Sc. & TECH. 5679, 5679-80 (2010), available athttp://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es903811p. inNew York, the depth of
the Marcellus Formation ranges from surface-level to more than 7000 feet beneath the surface. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation anticipates that most drilling activities will target the Marcellus Formation
at depths greater than 2000 feet. N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Marcellus
Shale, ENERGY & CLIMATE: OIL & GAS, http:/xxwww.dec.ny.govienergy/46288.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
2 J. DANIEL ARTHUR ET AL., ALL CONSULTING, HYDRATLIC FRACTURNG CONSIDERMfIONS FOR NATURAL GAs WELLS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE (presented at The
Groundwater Protection Council, 2008 Annual Forum, Cincinnati, Ohio, Sept.
24-28, 2008), available at www.thefriendsvillegroup.com/HydraulicFracturingReportl.2008.pdf.
Id. at 8.
4Richard A. Kerr, NaturalGasfrom Shale Bursts onto the Scene, 328 SCIENCE 1624,
1625 (2010), available at http://xwww.sciencemag.org/content/328/5986/1624.
full.pdf.
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Shale gas development utilizes a combination of horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology. "Horizontal drilling"
refers to a technique where a well is first drilled vertically down to
the appropriate depth and then horizontally through the shale deposit
for several thousand feet. Horizontal drilling, by increasing the
degree of contact between the well and the shale formation, allows
for greater gas recovery than would vertical drilling alone: however,
because shale formations are generally non-porous, an additional
technique called "hydraulic fracturing" is utilized to induce fractures
in the shale deposit and increase gas flow. These fissures are created
by "pumping a fluid and a propping material such as sand down the
well under high pressure." 6
Anticipating the growth of these practices within New York,
SUNY Buffalo Law School convened a symposium on Hydraulic
Fracturing in the Marcellus Shale on March 28 and 29, 2011. This
article is a written version of a presentation given at that symposium,
which sought to identify concerns about the impact of Marcellus
Shale horizontal drilling on public lands in New York. This article
establishes the scope of, and exceptions to, the alienation of parkland
doctrine and evaluates its potential application to subsurface drilling
below public trust lands. Part I addresses the public trust doctrine
and the alienation of public lands under New York law. It identifies
the parameters of the term "parkland" for purposes of the public
trust doctrine and examines whether subsurface land may constitute
parkland. Part II proceeds to examine other questions relevant to
the application of the public trust doctrine given the assumption
that subsurface land does constitute parkland, including whether
horizontal drilling below the surface of public lands implicates the
public trust as it applies to the alienation of public lands and whether
any exceptions apply.

'N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Marcellus Shale, ENERGY
OIL AND GAs,

2012).
6Id.

AND CLIMATE.

http://xwww.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.htnl (last visited Jan. 22,
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NEW YORK'S PUBLIC TWUST DOCTRINE AND ITs APPLICATION

TO PARKLAND

The developed law relating to the alienation of parkland is
one aspect of New York's public trust doctrine. The origins of the
public trust doctrine are generally traced back to Roman law and
the Institutes of Justinian, which can further be traced back to the
Institutes and Journals of Gaius. The Institutes of Justinian state:
"By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the
sea." 9 This concept of Roman law was ultimately adopted into
English common law following the Magna Carta and from there
subsequently made its way to the American colonies.0 While earlier
cases referencing public trust elements exist,) Illinois Central
'See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Henquinet & Tracy Dobson, The Public Trust Doctrine and
SustainableEcosystems: -4Great Lakes Fisheries Case Study, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 322, 325 (2006); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the
Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL.
L.J. 223, 224 (2006). See generally DAVID C. SLADE ET. AL, PUTTING THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO TM
MANAGEMENT OF LANDs, WATERS, AND LIVING RESOURCES OF TH

COASTA

STATES

(1990).
I Slade et al., supra note 7, at 1.
9 David C. Slade, Public Trust Doctrine-]01,in THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: Tim
OWNERSHIP AN7D MANAGEMENT OF LANDs, WATER AND LIVING RESOURCES 59 (Albany
Law School Government Law Center ed., 1991). The Digest of Justinian elaborates upon these rights, noting, for example, "The right of fishing in the sea from
the shore belongs to all men." DIG.1.8.4, as reprintedin Slade et al., supranote
7, at 5.
0See sources cited supra note 7; see also John Meyer, Using the Public Trust
Doctrine to Ensure the National Forests Protect the Public from Climate Change,
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 195, 212 (2010). As one of the original
thirteen colonies, the public trust doctrine passed into the common law of New
York directly; the public trust doctrine expanded to non-original states via the
Equal Footing Doctrine. See Slade, supranote 9, at 65.
"See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. I (N.J. 1821) ("Navigable rivers, where the
tide ebbs and flows, the ports, bays, coasts of the sea, including both the waters
and the land under the waters, for the purposes of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all other uses of the water and its products,
are common to all the people of New Jersey.").
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Railroad Co. v. Illinoisl2 is most commonly cited as the essential
expression of the public trust doctrine in the United States.
Illinois Central examined the Illinois State Legislature's
attempt to grant a railroad title to the lands underlying the Chicago
harbor in Lake Michigan. The Court held that Illinois was barred
by the public trust doctrine from conveying the Chicago harbor to a
private entity:
That the state holds the title to the lands under
the navigable waters of Lake Michigan, within
its limits, in the same manner that the state holds
title to soils under tide water, by the common law,
we have already shown: and that title necessarily
carries with it control over the waters above them,
whenever the lands are subjected to use.

.

.. It is

a title held in trust for the people of the state, that
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry
on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing
therein, freed from the obstruction or interference
of private parties..

.

. [A]bdication is not consistent

with the exercise of that trust which requires the
government of the state to preserve such waters for
the use of the public.

.

.. A grant of all the lands

under the navigable waters of a state has never
been adjudged to be within the legislative power:
and any attempted grant of the kind would be
held, if not absolutelyvoid on its face, as subject
to revocation. The state can no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and soils under
them, so as to leave them entirely under the use
and control of private parties, except in the instance
of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the
navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels
can be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its
12

146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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police powers in the administration of government
and the preservation of the peace.1
Illinois Central represents the public trust doctrine in the
United States at its most basic level. The case reflects the traditional
scope of the public trust doctrine: the public right to use waters for
navigation, fishing, and commerce. However, it also highlights the
expansion of the doctrine to navigable-in-fact freshwater streams
and rivers; while the public trust doctrine of Roman law contained
similar provisions, English law, through which the doctrine reached
the United States, covered only tidewaters.14
This expansion is a culmination of two prior cases, The
Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh and Barney v. Keokuk."1 The
Propeller Genessee Chief in affirming the constitutionality of the
federal expansion of admiralty jurisdiction, pointed to the stark
differences in geography between the island of Great Britain and
the vast inland expanse of the United States: "It is evident that a
definition that would at this day limit public rivers in this country to
tide-water rivers is utterlv inadmissible. We have thousands of miles
of public navigable water, including lakes and rivers in which there
is no tide."6 In contrast, on a comparatively small island like Great
Britain, the definition of navigable water to mean tidewater alone
"xwas a sound and reasonable one, because there was no navigable
stream in the country beyond the ebb and flow of the tde
In Barney, the Court stated "all waters are deemed navigable which
are really so" and further that "[the proprietorship of the beds and
shores of navigable waters] properly belongs to the States by their
inherent sovereignty." 8
One trust development of English common law not discarded
in the transfer of the doctrine to the United States is the separation
Id at 452-53.
et al., supra note 7, at 15.
, See id at 20-23.
1653 U.S. 443, 457 (1851).
'7 1d at 454.
"Barney v.Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336, 338 (1876). Note, however, that New York
law originally developed under a contrary assumption. See infra pp. 10-11.
14Slade
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of trust lands into two ownership interests: the jus publicuin and
the subservient jus privatum; under Roman law, ownership of the
shores or the waters was simply impossible (res nullius).9
"Thejus
publicum refers to the rights of the public in the use and enjoyment
of trust lands and waters; a state may not convey this interest
into private ownership.20 The jus privatuin, in contrast, refers to
"proprietary rights in the use and possession of land beneath tidal
waters and navigable freshwaters." Thus the jus privatum, while
it may be conveyed into private ownership, does not include the
right to prohibit the public from exercising its rights under the just
publicum.
The public trust doctrine evinces the same components as
other legal trusts: the state acts as trustee, safeguarding trust assets
(traditionally navigable waters and the underlying land) for the benefit
of current and future generations (the beneficiaries). However, the
precise expression of this trust varies from state to state because each
state is responsible for applying the public trust doctrine within its
borders." Some states conceive of the doctrine in a fairly traditional
matter, while others have expanded the doctrine considerably. Most
states conceptualize the public trust doctrine as protecting public
rights beyond the conventional trilogy of navigation, commerce,
and fishing. It is not uncommon to find states protecting other
uses, from "bathing, [to] sport fishing, boating, surfing, swinuning,
tourism, [and] enjoying the scenic beauty of the resource .
Some states have gone further yet, expanding the doctrine to cover
19Slade

et al., supra note 7, at 15.

20Id. at xxxix.
21

Id.

2

Id.

23ALEXANDRA

B. KLASS & LING-YEE HUANG, CTR. FOR PROGRLESSIVE REFORM, RE-

STORING Tm TRUST: WATER RLSOLTRCES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, AMANUAL
FOR ADVOCATEs 3 (2009), available at http://,",'www.progressivereform.org/articles!
CPR PublicTrustDoctrineManual.pdf; Slade, supra note 9, at 4.
24
Slade et al., supra note 7, at 5.

John C.Maguire, Fashioningan Equitable V/ision for Public Resource Protection and Development in Canada: The Public Trust Doctrine Revisited and Reconceptualized, 71J. LENVT. L. & PiRA. 1, 13 (1997) (discussing the development
2

of the public tirust doctrine in the United States).
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groundwater or affirmatively protecting environmental resources. 6
It is thus necessary to proceed to a specific examination of the public
trust doctrine under New York law.
A. The Public Trust Doctrine in New York State
The public trust doctrine, as developed in New York,
historically has not extended to cover environmental concerns.
Although New York has expanded the range of uses protected under
the doctrine, doctrinal development has primarily focused on public
rights to the foreshore, the conveyance of submerged lands, and,
more recently, the full scope of the trust waters for purposes of the
public right of passage. A large body of case law is also devoted
to restricting the alienation of parklands. Some precedent exists to
support environmentally protective uses of the doctrine, but such
references are scattered and do not emerge as a consistent doctrinal
theme.
26

See KLAss & HUANG, supranote 23; DavidAladjem, The Public Trust Doctrine:
Yew Frontiers for Sustainable Water Resources Managemnent, 25 Nxr. RLSOURCES
& ENV'T 17 (2010); see also nre Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447
(Haw. 2000) ("[T]he public trust doctrine applies to all water resources, unlimited
by any surface-ground distinction."); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 260 (1971)
("The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs.

. .

. There is a growing public recognition that one

of the most important public uses of the tidelands ... is the preservation of those
lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific
study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for
birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the
area."); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) ("The state
of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty to eradicate the present pollution
and to prevent further pollution in its navigable waters."); Nat'I Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
27
See Bisignano v. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 132 Misc.2d 850, 851-52 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1986) ("The purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Freshwater Wetlands Act was to strike a balance between the requirements of agricultural, economic and social development and environmental conservation. Judicial recognition of the significance of the public trust doctrine has resulted in the imposition
of a special duty upon the DEC to safeguard wetlands within the State."); People
of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 775 (Sup. Ct. 1972) ("The entire
ecological system supporting the waterways is an integral part of them [the water-
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Case law on public access to and use of the foreshore,
defined as the area of a shore that lies between the average high
tide mark and the average low tide mark, aptly demonstrates New
York's moderate expansion of the public trust doctrine to safeguard
an increasing variety of public uses. One early twentieth century
case declared:
The foreshore or land under the waters of the sea
and its arms, between high and low-water mark,
is subject, first, to the jus publicui- the right of
navigation, and when the tide is out, the right of
access to the water for fishing, bathing and other
lawful purposes to which the right of passage over
the beach may be a necessary incident. Such land is
also subject, secondly to the jus privatum, the rights
of the owner of the foreshore, the town of Oyster
Bay in this case, which holds the land in its corporate
political capacity, in trust for the public good ... [and]
[t]hirdly the rights of the riparian owner, the owner
of the upland fronting on navigable tide waters,
over the foreshore are rights of reasonable, safe and
convenient access to the water for navigation, fishing
and such other uses as commonly belong to riparian
ownership."
These stated public uses ofthe foreshore, although evidencing
slight expansion, are not far removed from the traditional trilogy of
navigation, commerce, and fishing; bathing and passage for other
lawful purpose are added." Fifty years later, the realm of acceptable
ways] and must necessarily be included within the purview of the trust. We now
know that wetlands perform useful functions indeed.", rev 'd on other grounds,
359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1973). Echoes of the public trust concept may be
found in environmental provisions of New York constitutional and statutory law
as well. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV,§ 4; N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw§§ 15-1601(1),
15-0103(8) (McKinney 2011); N.Y. PUB. LANDs LAw § 75(7)(a) (McKinney 2011).
28 Tiffany v.Town of Oyster Bay, 136 N.E. 224, 225-26 (N.Y. 1922) (citation
omitted).
2
9 The collection of seawxeed wxas not included; see People v.Brennan, 255 N.Y.S.
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uses had been much expanded. The court in Tucci v. Salzhauer held
that pushing a baby carriage was a proper use of the foreshore under
thejus publicum7, elaborating:
When the tide is in, he may use the water covering
the foreshore for boating, bathing, fishing and other
lawful purposes: and when the tide is out, he may
pass and repass over the foreshore as a means of
access to reach the water for the same purposes and
to lounge and recline thereon ..4. .
Tcci and other recent cases clearly demonstrate that the
protection of purely recreational uses is now squarely within the
scope of the doctrine.
A second facet of New York's public trust doctrine case law
elucidates the geographic scope of its applicability as relating to
protected public rights and state title to submerged lands. As in many
other eastern states, New York courts began to wrestle with trust
issues, particularly regarding who had title to submerged lands, long
before the U.S. Supreme Court defined the scope and effect of the
federal public trust doctrine.3 Before the federal presumption that
states have title to the submerged lands underlying their navigable
waters3 was declared, eastern states generally relied on the English
common law rule, which gave states title only to lands submerged
under tidal waters. Thus, early New York cases found that while
the state owned submerged tidal lands, riparian landowners had title
331 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
0336 N.Y.S.2d 721 (App. Div. 1972), aff'd, 307 N.E.2d 256 (N.Y. 1973); see
also Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 203-04 (N.Y. 1997)
(contrasting rivers subject to the ebb and flow of the tide as "devoted to the public
use, for all purposes, as well for navigation as for fishing").
' Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, PropertyRights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN.
ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 2 (2007).
2
See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 282 (1997);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892).
1 Craig, supra note 31, at 6.
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to adjacent submerged lands up to the center of non-tidal rivers.> As
the U.S. Supreme Court slowly fleshed out the federal public trust
doctrine, New York gave deference to the wealth of preexisting state
common law and retained the tidal test for determining title, while
using the newer navigability-in-fact test to establish the scope of the
doctrine for purposes of public trust rights and use. Thus, courts
have found a right to public use of navigable-in-fact waterways even
where the river bottom is privately owned in its entirety.36 Though
the navigability-in-fact test is rooted in commerce,3 one recent
case concerning a trespass action against recreational canoeists,
Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, held "that evidence of
the river's capacity for recreational use is in line with the traditional
test of navigability, that is, whether a river has a practical utility
for trade or travel."3 The court further noted that "the right to
navigate carries with it the incidental privilege to make use, when
absolutely necessary, of the bed and banks, including the right to
portage on riparian lands>" Nevertheless, even following adoption
of a navigability-in-fact rule, New York courts have still found the
public to have a lesser array of rights in non-tidal but navigable
waters as compared to tidal waters.4
34 See,

e.g., Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 94 N.E. 199, 202-03 (N.Y
1911) (noting, however, that the Hudson and Mohawk rivers remain public and
are exceptions to the general rule); see also People v. Sys. Props., 120 N.Y.S.2d
269, 274-76 (N.Y.App. Div. 1953) (state ownership over large navigable-in-fact
lakes, i.e. Lake George).
3Craig, supra note 31, at 13; See Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d
199, 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (finding public trust doctrine inapplicable to nonnavigable waterway).
6Craig, supra note 31, at 15-16.
The definition has been codified at N.Y. NAv. LAw§ 2(5) (McKinney 2011)
("'Navigable in fact' means 'navigable in its natural or unimproved condition,
affording a channel for useful commerce of a substantial and permanent character
conducted in the customary mode or trade and travel on water.'").
3706 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (N.Y 1998).
39Id. at 1197.
40 Craig, supra note 31, at 17. See Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d
201, 204 (N.Y. 1997) ("[T]he long-standing public easement of navigation in navigable-in-fact rivers does not sweep awXay or displace other rights accompany ing
the private owxnership of the bed of a navigable-in-fact river, including that of ex-
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1. Parkland Is a Public Trust Asset in New York
New York has moved beyond the traditional confines of
the public trust doctrine and expanded it to include parkland. This
facet of the New York public trust doctrine, restricting the alienation
of parklands, is well developed and demonstrates the evolving.,
transformative potential ofthe public trust doctrine. Parkland in New
York "is impressed with a public trust" and may not be 1) alienated
or 2) otherwise converted to a non-park use without the authorization
of the New York State Legislature." Alienation of parkland case
law primarily deals with municipal lands, though nothing restricts
its application to cover state-owned lands. Any exceptions to the
doctrine are confined to truly temporary or de ininimis uses.42
Before proceeding with an inquiry under the alienation of
parkland doctrine, it is necessary to define the parameters of the
term "parkland" as used in this context. At its most basic level, "[a]
park is a pleasure ground set apart for recreation of the public, to
promote its health and enjoyment."' Though Williams v Gallatin
also states that a park "need not and should not be a mere field or
open space," 44 landscaping is unnecessary; the preservation of land
in its natural condition may qualify as parkland. The New York
Court of Appeals has declared, "[O]ur law is well settled: dedicated
park areas in New York are impressed with a public trust for the
benefit of the people of the State."46 Parkland may be "dedicated"
for public use via:
clusive fishery."); Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1970) ("When the owner of the adjacent upland acquires title to lands under
navigable waters, he may fill in such lands, making upland out of the foreshore,
and thus extinguish thefjus publicum . ... ").
41

Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d at 1053-54
(N.Y. 2001).
42
See id. at 1054-55 ("[T]here may be "de minimis" exceptions from the public
trust doctrine . . . ."); Chatham Green, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 765 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454
(Sup. Ct. 2003) (twenty-three month occupation not temporary).
43Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920).
44
Id. In context, this statement from Williams may be read to merely suggest that
the inclusion of structures within parkland is permissible provided they relate to
park purposes.
4 1raushaar v. Zion, 135 N.Y.S.2d 491, 494 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
46
Friends of an Cortlandt Park, 750 N.E.2d at 1054-55 (emphasis added).
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an unequivocal express or implied offer by the
owner and, where required, an express or implied
acceptance by the public. Thus, a parcel of property
may become a park by express provisions in a deed
or legislative enactment or by implied acts, such as
the continued use of the parcel as a park. 47
The implied dedication inquiry looks to both
the intent behind the original land acquisition and
the actual use of the property following acquisition.
A strong case is presented where evidence firmly
suggests that land was first acquired for use as
parkland and actually utilized as such. 8
Whether property has become a park by implication is a
question of fact, "which must be determined by such evidence as the
owner's acts and declarations and the circumstances surrounding the
use of the land. The burden of proof rests on the party asserting that
the land has been dedicated for public use." 49 A finding of implied
dedication via park use requires "unequivocal" evidence; sporadic,
incidental, and unauthorized use does not suffice. 0 Property
47

Angiolillo v. Town of Greenburgh, 735 N.Y.S.2d 66, 73 (App. Div. 200 1) (citing Gerwxitz v. City of Long Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd 358
N.Y.S.2d 957 (App. Div. 1974) and Matter of Lazore v. Bd. of Trs. of Vill. of
Massena, 594 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 1993)).
43
8 See Kenny v. Bd. of Trs. of Garden City, 735 N.YS.2d 606, 607 (App. Div.
2001) ("[The] intent to acquire the property was essentially for recreational uses.
Although the instruments of conveyance do not contain such restrictive language,
it is undisputed that the property wxas utilized for recreational purposes. ... [Tjhe
property was impressed with apublic trust."); Riverview Partners v. City of Peekskill, 710 N.Y.S.2d 601, 602 (App. Div. 2000) (implied dedication established
wxhere property wxas purchased for use as a park, identified as "Fort Hill Park"
on city maps and at park entrance, consistently used as a park, and maintained
and improved as a park); Village of Croton-On-Hudson v.Westchester Cnty., 331
N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (App. Div. 1972) (dedication and acceptance by implication
found where property was acquired for park purposes and utilized as a park for
forty-five years despite absence of formal dedication).
49
Angiolillo v. Town of Greenburgh, 735 N.Y.S.2d 66, 73 (App. Div. 2001) (citations omitted).
£ Roosevelt Island Residents Ass'n v. Roosevelt Island Operating Corp., No.
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in private use is unlikely to qualif1 as parkland.i Neither does
public use for non-park purposes support an implied dedication.
Preliminary steps toward instituting park use are not equal to park
dedication."
Significantly, longstanding use of the tenn "park" to describe
a parcel of land is not alone sufficient to render it parkland for
purposes of the doctrine. In one early case, the New York Court of
Appeals deemed an unenclosed strip of land, purportedly a park,
unsuitable as anything other than a passage way. The implied
dedication doctrine does not extend to parkways. 5
While case law deals exclusively with village, town, city,
and county parkland, there is no apparent barrier to the doctrine's
use in the context of state-oxwned lands. Two factors likely
contribute to the under-representation of state-owned lands in
doctrine controversies. First, compared to municipal officials, the
greater size of state bureaucracy may restrain state actors seeking
to redesignate parklands in response to passing political pressures.
Second, other statutory and constitutional provisions prohibit the
alienation of certain state lands absent additional procedure, making
reliance on the doctrine unnecessary. While the alienation of city
118270/04, 2005 WL 1306479, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 2005) ("Vague or
contradictory evidence of parkland dedication is inadequate, as a matter of law, to
establish that a particular site is parkland.").
'See Cathedral Church of St. John the Divine v. Dormitory Auth. of N.Y., 645
N.Y.S.2d 637, 642-43 (App. Div. 1996) (property leased for past sixty years and
"used as a private sitting area for nursing home residents and visitors" not parkland).
52See Kuzma v. City of Buffalo, No. 70328, 2006 WL 615998 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar.
8, 2006) (medical campus not a de facto park).
5 See Shapiro v. Town of Ramapo, 2010 WL 4591193, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
18, 2010) (steps taken toward creating a golf course did not constitute an act of
dedication where several logistical hurdles remained).
54 Perrin v.N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 36 N.Y. 120, 124 (N.Y.
1868) ("Although called a
park, as we have seen, it was not a park, and its intended use as a street was ... beyond question."); see also Roosevelt Island, No. 118270/04, 2005 WL 1306479,
at * 15 ("Octagon Park has been, and still is, considered "Open Space Area.").
"Angiolillo, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 68 ("Because a parkxway is not the same as a park,
we hold that such excess parkway property may be sold.").
56 See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV § I (forest preserve land forever wild); id. art. XIV
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parks is also forbidden by statute, no such provisions exist for town
or county parks.5
Multiple New York State land classes may fall under the
definition of parkland. State parks and the forest preserves would
almost certainly qualify. State forests may also qualify since
recreation is one reason for their acquisition. 8 State forests have
been termed parkland within the context of the Federal Highway

Act.59
II. APPLICATION

OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO

SUBSURFACE IMPACTS

No court has spoken directly to the doctrine's applicability
to a subsurface use or alienation.60 In fact, the Court of Appeals
specifically avoided the issue in Friends of In CortlandtPark v
City ofNew ork, stating:
§4 (State nature and historical preserve lands "shall not be taken or otherwise
disposed of except by law enacted by two successive regular sessions of the legislature."); see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAx§ 9-0501(1) (McKinney 2011) ("[R]
eforestation areas ... shall be forever devoted to the planting ... [of] trees."). But
ef N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw§ 9-0507 (McKinney 2011) ("[T]he department ...
may, in any lands acquired by the state in accordance with section 9-050 1,enter
into leases for the purpose of aiding in discovering and removing any oil or gas
upon such lands . . . .").
7
See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw §20(2) (McKinney 2011).
8
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw§ 9-0501 (McKinney 2011).
59 Stewart Park & Reservation Coal., Inc. v. Slater, 358 F. Supp. 2d 83, 98
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[T]he only parkland in issue is the 7,000 acres west of Drury
Lane, which encompasses the 5,265 acres known as the Stewart State Forest.").
60 The language of Gallatin could theoretically support a surface-centric doctrinal focus. Williams states "no objects . . . which have no connection with park
purposes . . . should be permitted to encroach upon [a park] without legislative

authority." Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920) (emphasis added).
This language could be interpreted to merely require legislative approval when
the proposed use would rest upon the park, but not when the use would occur
entirely below the park's surface and would not disrupt public access. However,
courts have not read this language so strictly. Even the court in United States v.
New brk agreed that Williams did "not speak to whether an underground plant is
an encroachment or an intrusion on parkland." 96 . Supp. 2d 195, 202 (L.D.N.Y
2000).
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[We] need not resolve the interrelated
question whether an underground installation that
in no way intrudes on park use requires legislative
approval. That an appreciable area of the park will be
closed for more than five years, and that some future
uses of the land will be inhibited by the presence
of the underground structure, render that issue
hypothetical. 6
That case examined the proposed construction of an
underground water treatment plant, whichwould necessarily interfere
with the operation of a park golf course and driving range for over
five years. 6 Provided that both the surface rights and the subsurface
rights to the park parcel are in government possession, the doctrine
is theoretically applicable to subsurface alienations. No explicit
restriction of the doctrine to surface parkland exists. Nevertheless,
a review of past practice presents an uncertain picture. Though the
District Court in United States v City ofNeu York conceded several
instances where government bodies sought legislative authorization
prior to the conveyance of easements for subsurface infrastructure
projects, the court was quick to establish such authorizations as
exceptions and not the rule.64
Furthermore, it is possible that New York courts might
differentiate the situation presented by horizontal drilling from the
sort of conventional subsurface infrastructure project highlighted in
City of Van CortlandtParkbased on the absence of surface or nearsurface drilling activities given the great depth at which horizontal
61750 N.E.2d 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 2001).

at 1052.
The presentation at the symposium, and thus this article, do not examine split
estates, the particulars of subsurface mineral rights, or the mechanics of compulsory integration, all ofwhich could potentially impact the doctrine's applicability.
4
6 United States v. New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d 195, 206 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). The
case ultimately was discredited by the Court of Appeals in Friends of Van CortlandtParkto the extent that it found legislative authorization not required. Friends
of an Cortlandt Park answered the question "Does any aspect of the proposed
[water treatment plant] require state legislative approval?," certified by the United
States Court of Appeals. 95 N.Y.2d at 1053 (N.Y. 2001).
621d.
6
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drilling would take place. Much of the Marcellus Shale lies more
than 2000 feet beneath the surface. Drilling at such depths presents
unique questions, which New York courts have not yet had the
opportunity to address. At least one state with greater experience
in shale gas development has suggested that default rules may not
apply to activities several thousand feet below the surface:
Had Coastal caused something like proppants to
be deposited on the surface of Share 13, it would
be liable for trespass .... But that maxim - cujus
est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos "has no place in the modern world" . . . . The law of

trespass need no more be the same two miles below
the surface than two miles above.66
A New York court might similarly decide that horizontal
drilling at such depths is simply too distant from the surface parkland
above to be considered under the alienation of parkland doctrine. 7
Indeed, a New York State Comptroller Opinion from 1977
points in precisely this direction. The Comptroller concluded: "A
municipality may enter into a gas pooling or spacing unit agreement
whereby municipal parklands are used in such pool, and gas
underlying such lands may be extracted in exchange for a portion of
royalties, so long as any actual drilling is done on nonparklands." 68
The Comptroller's determination relied in large part on the reasoning
that "the portion of the municipal parkland which is necessary
6Marcellus formation depth varies significantly, from surface level to more than
7000 feet deep. However, New York anticipates most drilling will target areas
2000 feet or more beneath the surface. N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, supra
note 5.
66Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2008)
(citations omitted). Because it was unnecessary for the case's disposition, Garza
did not reach the ultimate question of whether subsurface fracturing gave rise to
an action for trespass under Texas law.
67Alternately, a court might find that such drilling fell under the alienation doctrine, but amounted to a de minimis interference. De minimis exceptions to the
doctrine are discussed in Section I.B. infra.
3
6 Op. N.Y. Comptoller No. 77-430 (1977), 1977 WL 4440, at *4.
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for park and recreation use is the 'surface' land and the natural
formations thereon."69 Because subterranean gas extraction would
not impact the surface use, and because the pooling agreement
would not necessitate the grant of an interest or estate in the surface
lands, no alienation of the surface lands would occur.
Of course, the Comptroller's Opinion does not conclusively
decide the question of the doctrine's applicability to horizontal
drilling. First, the extent to which courts will defer to this opinion is
uncertain: 1 it is not at all clear that the Comptroller has developed
an expertise with the public trust doctrine's application sufficient to
warrant judicial deference.
Second, the 1977 Comptroller's Opinion almost certainly
contemplates extraction using a strictly vertical well iocated entirely
off-site. Although horizontal drilling was conceptualized decades
earlier," the earliest horizontal wells in New York date only to the
1980s." Unlike an off-site vertical well, horizontal drilling extending
underneath parkland entails a concrete physical invasion. In sum,
the public trust doctrine is theoretically applicable to subsurface
parkland, but there is some reason to believe that a court may find
deep subsurface uses too distant from the surface park use to warrant
the doctrine's application - or rather, at a certain depth, a court may
cease to conceptualize subsurface lands as parkland at all, no matter
that the land technically underlies surface park area.

69Id.

at *3.

10 The opinion did affirmatively state that legislative approval would be required
for drilling gas wells on parkland. Id. at *2.
'1See Town of Mamaroneck PBA, Inc. v. N.Y. Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., 487
N.E.2d 905, 905 (N.Y. 1985) ("Although as the agency charged with implementing the policies of the Taylor Law, the Public Employment Relations Board is
presumed to have developed an expertise which requires us to accept its construction of that law if not unreasonable, with respect to the interpretation of other laws
where 'the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis."').
72
See ENERGY INTO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-TR-0565, DRILLING SIDEWAYs -A RLVIEW OF HORIZONTAL WELL TECHNOLOGY AND ITs DoMSTiC APPLICATION
7 (1993), available at ftp:f//tp.eia.doe.gov/petroleum/tr0565.pdf.
N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 5.
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A. The Public Trust Doctrine Requires Prior Legislative
Approval for a Non-Park Use or an Alienation of Parkland
If a court considers subsurface land to constitute parkland,
then an easement to permit horizontal drilling under parkland
theoretically amounts to an alienation, which is prohibited under
the public trust doctrine absent either an applicable exception or
authorization from the state legislature. An easement is defined as
"[a]n interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the
right to use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a
specific limited purpose." Although in dicta, one early case notes:
Whether the instrument here in question was
intended by the parties to create an estate or interest
in these parklands, either by way of lease, or by the
grant of an easement, or was intended to grant an
irrevocable license to maintain the structures for a
definite time, I should think, if it were necessary to
decide the question, that the intended purpose would
have amounted to an alienation of the rights of the
city in the park."
Further, when issues of alienation arise, municipalities have
sought legislative authorization for easements through parkland.76
Absent an applicable exception, the grant of an easement through
parkland requires the authorization of the State Legislature.
It is highly unlikely that a court would find natural gas
extraction to be a legitimate park use. Beginning with Williams v.
Gallatin, which held that leasing a building in Central Park to host
a private museum was not a park purpose, New York has strictly
limited the scope of accepted park uses. As the court explained in
Williams v. Gallatin:

74

BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 549 (8th ed. 2004).
Williams v. City of New York, 222 N.Y.S. 163, 166 (Sup. Ct. 1927), rev'd on
other grounds Williams v. Hylan, 227 N.Y.S. 392 (App. Div. 1928).
6See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City ofNewx York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055
(N.Y 2001) (citing 1998 N.Y Lawxs ch. 209; 1989 N.Y Lawxs ch. 533).
7

2011-2012]

SCRATCHING THE SURFACE

63

Are the purposes of the defendant Safety Institute of
America, in any proper sense, park purposes? They
are primarily utilitarian and educational in character.
Its proposed exhibition is instructive. It is for a
long period of years, and is not a mere temporary
show of things of passing interest. Incidentally it
may amuse those who frequent the park for health
and recreation, as any show of mechanical devices
might, but so far as it fails to promote means and
methods of safety and sanitation, and to advance
knowledge of such subjects, it fails to accomplish
its corporate purpose.
To promote the safety of mankind and to
advance the knowledge of the people in methods of
lessening the number of casualties and avoiding the
causes ofphysical suffering and premature death is the
purpose of the Safety Institute of America; to provide
means of innocent recreation and refreshment for the
weary mind and body is the purpose of the system of
public parks. The relation of the two purposes is at
best remote.'
When presented with the opportunity to expand the scope
of accepted park uses, courts have almost always rejected the
opportunity to do so. In 111iler v. City ofNew York, for example, the
court rejected the proposed construction of a private golf driving
range in a public park. Similarly, in Stephenson v Monroe County",
a court rejected as a non-park use a plan to use a public park as a
sanitary landfill irrespective of county plans to convert the mountain
of trash into a ski slope.
Thisisnotto suggestthatcourtswill neverpermitaprospective
use of a park for something other than recreation. For uses widely
accepted as appropriate, courts will not require legislative approval.
77

Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y 1920).
" 8Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34 (App. Div. 1964).
7
Stephenson v. Cnty. of Monroe, 351 N.Y.S.2d 232 (App. Div.1974).
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Thus, when the Commissioner of Parks proposed to lease space in
Central Park for a restaurant, the Court of Appeals allowed the deal
to proceed, noting that "the proof is very clear that there are, and
for many years have been, restaurant and related facilities in public
parks, including Central Park, and they are commonly regarded as
appropriate." Similarly, a court found that New York City acted
within its rights when granting a concession to a private party for
the development of an amphitheatre on Randall's Island because an
amphitheatre was a "permissible park use. 8
The proposed extraction of natural gas is in no way connected
with the recreational objectives of a park and would promote neither
the public's health nor its welfare. Given the reticence of New York
courts to expand the definition of park uses, it would be extraordinary
if a court found that horizontal drilling and gas extraction qualified
as a park use. Thus, assuming that the doctrine applies to subsurface
parkland, legislative approval would be required absent the existence
of an applicable exception.
B. Exceptions to the New York Rule Against Alienation of
Parkland
Given the New York Court of Appeals' deferral of the de
minimis question in Friendsof an CortlandtPark,it is unclear how
New York courts would respond to claims that horizontal drilling
extending under parkland does not require legislative approval.
Although horizontal drilling may constitute both a non-park use
and an alienation of parkland, a court nevertheless might find that
drilling would not reduce or interfere with the public's use of any
"795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 205 N.E.2d 850, 851 (N.Y 1965).
SFX Entmt, Inc. v. City of New York, 747 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (App. Div. 2002).
82The extent to which an increased gas supply promotes the public welfare through
reduced heating costs or some other means is immaterial; the question iswhether
the use promotes the public welfare in the usual manner of a park. See Friends
of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d at 1053 ("[A] park is a
recreational pleasure area set aside to promote public health and welfare . . . .");
Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1920) ("[T]o provide means of innocent recreation and refreshunent for the w
mind
"eary
and body is the purpose of
the system of public parks."').
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parklands - and on that rationale find it exempt from the doctrine.
The public trust protects public parks to "facilitate free public means
of pleasure, recreation and amusement and thus provide for the
welfare of the community."i"The doctrine may not apply where the
proposed use does not demonstrably interfere with the public's use
of parkland for these purposes. This reasoning was adopted by the
district court in United States v. City of New York.84
However, given the magnitude of potential impacts from
horizontal drilling, courts should find a de minimis exception
inapplicable. The maxim de ninimis non curat lex literally means
"the law cares not for trifles"- natural gas extraction has significant
and substantial impacts that will no doubt affect parkland and, as
such, the exception should not apply." Hydraulic fracturing could
have pernicious effects on parkland even if conducted via wellheads
located in non-park areas. One threat posed by hydraulic fracturing
is the withdrawal of substantial amounts of water necessary for the
production of millions of gallons of fracking fluid - the leakage
of wxhich may then cause contamination.86 This could result in a
reduction in area stream flow, the depletion of groundwater, and the
degradation of water quality. Such effects could in turn negatively
impact the public's use and enjoyment of parkland. Additionally, the
infrastructure necessary to support hydraulic fracturing will fragment
forests, causing ground water recharge to decrease, while surface
TWilliams, 128 N.E. at 123.
84

United States v. New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Op.
N.Y. COMPTROLLER No. 77-430 (1977), 1977 WL 4440.
See Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231
(1992).
16 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, RLVISED DRAiFT SUPPLEMENTAL
GENERIC ENVIRONILENTAL IMPACT STATEMLNT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING,
REGULATORY PROGRAM 5-93 (2011) [hereinafter RDSGEIS] ("[T]he entire multistage fracturing operation for a single well would require 2.4 million to 7.8 million gallons of water."); id. at 5-99 ("Flowback water volume, then, could be
216,000 gallons to 2.7 million gallons per well, based on a pumped fluid estimate
of 2.4 million to 7.8 million gallons... .); NATURAL RLSOURCEs DEF. COUNCIL, FACT
SHEET: PROTECTING NEW YORKERS HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT BY RLGLTLATING
DRILLING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE 3 (2009), available at http://72.32.110.154/
land/ files/marcellus.pdf (discussing chemical contamination).
1

RDSGEIS, supranote 86, at 6-6.
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runoff, soil erosion, and the risk of downstream flooding increase."
Thus, even if parklands themselves are not fragmented, they will
feel the effects of fragmentation in nearby forests. Arguably, these
and other threats posed by hydraulic fracturing render inapplicable
the de minimis exception.
Furthermore, given the extent of the Marcellus Shale
formation in New York, any determination of the public trust
doctrine's application to horizontal drilling will implicate significant
areas of parkland. "The prospective region for the extraction of
natural gas from Marcellus and Utica Shales has been roughly
described as an area extending from Chautauqua County eastward
to Greene, Ulster and Sullivan Counties, and from the Pennsylvania
border north to the approximate location of the east-west portion of
the New York State Thruway between Schenectady and Auburn." 89
This comprises almost half of the land of New York State. This
fact should caution a court, uncertain of the potential for surface
interferences, against categorically exempting horizontal drilling
from the doctrine's reach.
Of course, any examination of the environmental impact
from hydraulic fracturing begs the question of which impacts
should properly be considered in the de minimis analysis. In the
situation contemplated by this article, all surface drilling activity
would take place off-site, and the only physical intrusion would be
from the horizontal wellbore extending underneath parkland. The de
minimis analysis could extend to all drilling impacts or be limited
proportionately to the impacts likely to stem from the intrusive
wellbore(s) alone. One could argue that impacts from drilling
activities not directly related to the horizontal wellbore(s) traveling
under parkland should be excluded from the de minimis calculation
because they are physically distant from parkland. Any counter
argument would necessarily assert that if the denial of an easement
would prevent drilling and thereby protect parklands from the
harmful cumulative impact of all drilling activities, then the public
trust obliges such denial. Case law on this question is insufficiently
developed to be instructive.
83
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A separate consideration is whether all impacts to parkland
should be considered on their own merits or whether only impacts
sufficiently interfering with park use should be counted. The
alienation of parkland doctrine's emphasis on park versus nonpark use militates in favor of a use-based interpretation. Thus,
arguments linking impacts from hydraulic fracturing directly to a
decrease in the public's ability to use a park (for fishing, swimming,
etc.) may be most persuasive. Arguments primarily premised on
environmental harms should not be disregarded, however. Case law
amply demonstrates the capacity of the public trust doctrine writ
large to incorporate environmental rationales.9 0 Moreover, because
the existence of a viable fishery is necessarily a precondition to
the public's ability to fish, and because the right to fish is among
the oldest trust rights, many environmental hanns may in fact be
explicitly tied to the recreational use of parkland as well as to the
conventional trilogy of the public trust doctrine.9
Opponents of drilling under parkland could argue that any
recognition of a de ininimisexception for hydraulic fracturing would
constitute a substantial erosion of the public trust doctrine. Friends
of FVan CortlandtPark only recognized that de minimis exceptions
"may" exist, not that they definitely do." For over a century, New
York courts have voiced strong support for the preservation of
parkland under the doctrine. The recognition of specific exceptions
would be a step backward, depriving the doctrine of much of its
protective force. The continued integrity of the doctrine requires
that courts strictly construe the prohibition on non-park uses and the
alienation of parkland.
De ininimis exceptions may arise not only from the nature
of the incursion, but from its length as well. The New York Court of
Appeals in Friendsof Van CortlandtPark stated that "use for other
than park purposes, either for a period of years or permanently,
requires the direct and specific approval of the State Legislature,
plainly conferred."9 3
90See supranotes 23, 27.

See Slade, supranote 9, at 61.
N.E.2d 1050, 1054 ("While there may be "de minimis" exceptions from the
public trust doctrine, the magnitude of the proposed project does not call upon us
to draw such lines in this case.").
9Id. at 632 (emphasis added) (citing Ackerman v. Steisel, 480 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558
9

92750
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The determination of a use's temporary nature is a factspecific inquiry that "varies with the context of the case."94 In Bates
v. Holbrook,while the Department of Parks had legislative approval
to grant "temporary privileges" of park use to facilitate subway
construction, the court held that structures were not "temporary"
xxwhen they would exist throughout the three-year lifespan of the
project.95 In Friends of an CortlandtPark,the court found that the
installation of a water filtration plant underneath a golf driving range
was not a temporary use because it would deprive the public "of
valued park uses for at least five years." 96 Similarly, the Williams v.
Gallatin court held that the ten year lease of a Central Park building
was not temporary,? and the court in Ackerman v.Steiselheldthat the
on-going placement of municipal highway and sanitation vehicles
for twenty-five and fourteen years could "hardly be characterized
as temporary."" Finally, in Chatham Green, Inc. v. Bloomberg, the
court held that the New York City Police Department's twentythree month occupation of a park was not temporary and legislative
approval was therefore necessary."
The use of parkland for natural gas extraction and storage
could be a lengthy process. A typical wellpad employing hydraulic
fracturing for natural gas extraction would operate for a longer
period of time than the intrusions in Bates, Chatham, and Friends
of FVatn Cortlandt Park."o A court examining whether or not the
use of subterranean parkland for horizontal drilling was temporary
could look either to the permanent nature of wellbore infrastructure
and disturbance or to the comparatively temporary duration of gas
production from the pertinent wellbore(s) to aid in its determination.10 1
(App. Div. 1984)).
94 Chatham Green, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 765 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454 (Sup.
Ct. 2003).
95 Bates v. Holbrook, 64 N.E. 181, 183 (N.Y. 1902).
96 95 N.Y.2d at 631.
97 128 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1920)
98Ackerman v. Steisel, 480 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (App. Div. 1984).
99 765 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
'See RDSGEIS, supra note 86, at 2-5 ("[A] typical horizontal well in the Marcellus Shale (covering approximately 80 acres) may produce 1.0 to 1.5 [billion
cubc feet] of gas cumulatively over the first five years inservice."').
0'Because the pads themselves wxill
be situated off-site and horizontal wxelibores
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In either event, it seems unlikely that a court would term the gas
production activity temporary given the comparatively short-term
use disallowed in Chatham.
Notably, the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation
and Historic Preservation has explicitly addressed the doctrine's
applicability to the horizontal drilling scenario and, finding the
disposition of the issue uncertain, recommends that municipalities
seek legislative approval prior to permitting extraction of subsurface
resources:
It is unclear whether the removal of resources
beneath parkland without disrupting the surface of
the parkland, for example by horizontal directional
drilling, would be considered an alienation. . . .
[G]enerally speaking, real property law holds that
land ownership carries with it a bundle of rights,
including not only that which is on the surface, but
that which is beneath and above the surface as well.
This would suggest that any resources removed from
parkland, either on the surface, such as timber, or
beneath, such as oil and gas, are also held in trust for
the People of the State. Arguably, therefore, the rule
that a municipality can't sell its parkland without
obtaining Legislative permission applies equally to
the sale of the resources on and beneath the parkland.
State Parks therefore recommends that, until a
court addresses the issue directly, municipalities seek
the permission of the Legislature prior to leasing or
selling any of the resources on or beneath municipal
parkland.10 2

represent the only intrusion of parkland, it likely isthe length of time gas is produced from the intruding wellbore that governs.

I N.Y.S.

OFFICE OF PARKs, RECREATION AND HiSTORIC PREs., HANDBOOK ON THE

YORK 16 (2011),
available at http://nysparks.com/publications/documents/AlienationHandbook.
pdf.
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New York courts have consistently reaffirmed the principle
that legislative approval must be "plainly conferred" to meet the
requirements of the public trust. 03 Other New York courts have
held that legislative authority must be "special" or "direct."o fThe
New York Court of Appeals has also held that when there is a fair,
reasonable, and substantial doubt concerning the existence of an
alleged power in a municipality, the power should be denied." 0
Thus, when a municipality, agency or other government body wants
to alienate its parks or use them for non-park purposes, it first must
obtain from the legislature a clear and explicit grant of authority to
do so.
New York State law explicitly prohibits leasing of
parklands for gas exploration and extraction: "The department
may make leases on behalf of this state, upon such terms and
conditions including consideration as to the department seem just
and proper for: a. The exploration, development and production
of gas in state-owned lands, except state parklands and the lands
under the waters of Lake Ontario or along its shoreline."06Certain
exceptions do exist. For instance, gas exploration is permitted by
statute in State Forest reforestation areaso' with the approval of
the State Geologist: "Notwithstanding any provisions of Article
VII of the Public Lands Law to the contrary, the department, with
the approval of the state geologist, may, in any lands acquired
by the state in accordance with section 9-0501, enter into leases
for the purpose of aiding in discovering and removing any oil or
gas upon such lands or storage of gas or oil thereon." In most
'3Gallatin, 128 N.E. at 122-123; see Van Cortlandt, 750 N.E.2d at 1055; Ackerman, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
104Am. Dock Co. v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.S.2d 943, 956 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
("specific"); Sebring v. Quackenbush, 199 N.Y.S. 245, 248 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ("direct").
'n re City of New York, 126 N.E. 809 (N.Y. 1920).
o6 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw§ 23-1101 (McKinney 2011).
107Reforestation Areas comprise 94.5% of state forest lands. N.Y.

STATE DEP'T OF

ENVTL. CONSERVAJION, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR STATE FOREST MANAGEMENT 8
8

(2011).

9-0907 (McKinney 2011); See also N.Y. COUNTY LAW §
219 (McKinney 2011) ("The board of supervisors shall have powxVer to purchase,
acquire, or accept by gift lands for purposes of reforestation anti/or lease for the
'o ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw§

2011-2012]
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cases, however, the legislature has not pre-authorized drilling in
parkland.
THE FUTURE OF DRILLING ON PARKLAND IN NEW YORK

In September 2011., the New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") released a Revised
Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement
("RDSGEIS") for hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus shale play.
The RDSGEIS would prohibit surface drilling on certain types of
State-owned land but does not exclude access to areas below the
surface of parkland:
In order to ensure that the State fulfills the purposes
for which State Forests, State Wildlife Management
Areas, and State Parks were created, no surface
disturbance associated with horizontal drilling and
high-volume hydraulic fracturing would be permitted
on State Forests, Wildlife Management Areas or State
Parks. This prohibition does not include accessing
subsurface resources locatedwithin these areasfrom
adjacentprivate lands.1o"

The DEC also proposed regulations to govern natural gas
development. The pertinent proposed regulation tracks the language
of the RDSGEIS:
(ag) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title,
surface disturbance associated with the drilling of a
natural gas well subject to Part 560 of this Title on
State owned lands is prohibited and no permit shall
be issued authorizing such activity. This prohibition
shall apply to any pre-existing and new leases issued
for oil and gas development on State owned lands.
purpose of aiding in discovering and removing oil and/or gas from such reforested
land....).
9
0oRDSGEIS,
supra note 86, at 7-101 (emphasis added).
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This prohibition shall not apply to subsurface access
to subsurface resources located under State owned
lands from adjacent private areas.1 0
It appears to be the DEC's view that the impacts on parkland
would be de minimis, and thus potentially excluded from the
protection of the public trust doctrine. Advocates have already urged
the DEC to extend the prohibition against surface disturbance of
State-owned lands to subsurface resources as well.'1 Ultimately,
if access to subsurface resources below parklands is not barred by
regulation, it will be up to New York courts to determine whether
they are protected by New York's public trust doctrine as it applies
to the alienation of parkland.

"oN.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 6, §190.8(ag) (proposed).
"
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